A Thought on Induction - Grue and Time

In some treatises on induction, time seems to be essential: Induction is presented as a process where, over time, more and more assertive examples are encountered, and therefore the inductive conclusion gets, in some way or the other, more and more certain. This underlies, it seems to be, for example Goodman's grue and bleen paradox.

Right now, I don't see why time is an essential and different property from all other properties. Induction is done on a set of examples: If I pull a hundred tiles from an urn containing thousands, and all rectangular are blue, then I could inductively assume that all rectangles are blue. Of course, this hinges on all those other aspects of induction that have to be discussed—but by itself, there is no need to pull the examples one after the other. But then, the grue problem disappears: If time is just another property of the input examples, either I pull only blue rectangles for t=now and t=then; and then the induction result is "rectangle implies blue". Or I pull blue rectangles for t=now and green ones for t=then, and then the result is "rectangle implies grue" (or was it bleen?).

Of course, there is at least one practical problems to sampling over different times: I cannot sample something from the future. But there are also many other sampling problems, and in scienes and humanities, we have to be inventive to get rid of these; whereas in practical life, we may just accept them and live with coarser inductive approximations. But this is not a problem of inductive reasoning per se. And one solution is always to go home for now and wait until t=then when we can sample better. So you might have to wait for a solar eclipse to get an example of what you are interested in.