Language 1

Language is always poetic. Words, and the arrangement of words, evoke associations, first through their sound, their meaning, their typical environment, but then also through the personal experience attached to them. Written language is poetic, but its poetic associations are of course different from spoken language—e.g., visual impression and location create additional associations—, and spoken and heard language is dfiferent from each other. and, to repeat, all language encountered is poetic because it is experienced by individuals who, themselves, are poetic.

"Set", as used by mathematicians, has own sound, its associations (to drawings, to numbers, to proofs, to problems, to extra-mathematical concepts like a tennis set); "Menge", the corresponding German terms, shares many of those; but also has a direct association to many things. Getting rid of associations that are deemed irrelevant is difficult, and specialists try to do it with definitions; but ultimately only succeed with Wittgenstein II, i.e., by training the "right" language games over and over and over again. One helpful method is to coin new terms: "homomorphic" or "autopoiesis". But extending the usages to other areas cannot be prohibited, and thereby new associations emerge and sink into the minds of writers, readers, speakers, and listeners.

Establishing a regime that evaluates use of language in a discipline is therefore "necessary," i.e., it happens. "Autopoiesis" has been used in juridical contexts, but never in court language. Homomorphisms can be drawn over into philosophy, but the language of cattle raising does not allow to use it, until today. Of course, delineating "court language", "philosophy" or "talking about cattle" are, in itself, enterprises that include language, but this is "just so". Langugage games appear to converge almost always, i.e., people are happy with pvercome traditions, thoughts, and uses of words. Thus, boundary transgressions are typically easily recognized; and the desire for constructive interaction, custom and, maybe, laziness will be enough to prevent them. If not, an element of power will come in.

However, if an enterprise like philosophy draws significant breath of life from such transgressions, sanctioning of unwanted boundary transgressions requires even more, and, at places, mainly power. Life is so much more than language—it is earning a living, seeing oneself accepted, being attracted by things, event or poeple, having possibilities; all this can be shaped or even revoked by power. And so, language, ultimately, because it is poetic, is also shaped by power, even in contexts where power itself is not the main game and goal: Which is to say, everywhere.

Still, nothing new here.